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ABSTRACT
Carving up the world into Global North and Global South has
become an established way of thinking about global difference
since the end of the Cold War. This binary, however, erases
what this paper calls the Global East – those countries and
societies that occupy an interstitial position between North
and South. This paper problematises the geopolitics of knowl-
edge that has resulted in the exclusion of the Global East, not
just from the Global North and South, but from notions of
globality in general. It argues that we need to adopt a strategic
essentialism to recover the Global East for scholarship. To that
end, it traces the global relations of IKEA’s bevelled drinking
glass to demonstrate the urgency of rethinking the Global East
at the heart of global connections, rather than separate from
them. Thinking of such a Global East as a liminal space com-
plicates the notions of North and South towards more inclusive
but also more uncertain theorising.
Introduction: Losing the East
Picture the ‘Global North’ for a moment. Like most others, you will think of
countries in North America and Western Europe, perhaps also Japan and
Australia – the rich states and large metropolitan centres. And the Global
South? Latin America and Africa come to mind, much of Asia, too. Places
where people do not enjoy the same privilege as in the North. The world thus
conjured before our inner eye appears complete, but it is far from. On the
contrary, the binary of North and South creates a black hole: all those
societies that fall somewhere between North and South – too rich to be in
the South, too poor to be in the North. And this is no small black hole: it
encompasses those societies that took part in what was the most momentous
global experiment of the twentieth century: to create communism.1 This
‘Global East’, as this paper shall call it, is suspended somewhere in the
shadows between the Global North and the Global South, not quite belong-
ing to either. This paper seeks to retrieve it from there.
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The distinction between a richer, powerful Global North and a poorer,
less-powerful Global South is perhaps the most influential way of categoris-
ing the world and thinking about global difference today. That distinction
has not just become a staple of academic research, spawning several journals,
numerous research centres and hundreds of books that carry the Global
South in the title. It has also started to enter the standard vocabulary of
scholars, activists and, increasingly, policy debates. In climate change talks,
for example, the North–South divide has become a prominent moniker for
framing political differences over how to address global warming. The
millennial rediscovery of poverty as a challenge by the United Nations
Millennium Development Goals gave further currency to the North–South
divide.
Rather than mere geographical descriptors, the Global North and South
today signify primarily a political and epistemological project: a turn away
from the language of developmentalism and teleological progress that char-
acterised the attitudes of the Global North towards the South for decades and
continues to characterise it today; a re-orientation of knowledge production
from the universalism and euro-centrism in the North and a valorisation of a
multiplicity of knowing practices as found in the Global South; and a political
inspiration for the reconfiguration of global politics to give a voice to more
marginal nations (Dirlik 2007; Mignolo 2011). As such, the Global South is
part and parcel of the postcolonial project of making the subaltern speak
(Spivak 1988a).
The fall of most communist regimes, the so-called Second World, between
1989 and 1992 did not challenge the North–South distinction; quite the
opposite, it vindicated it. At Fukuyama’s (1992) end of history, the division
between rich and poor, and thus between North and South, endured, whereas
that between capitalism and communism vanished. With the evaporation of
the communist Other, the ideological East–West division evaporated too.
‘With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Second World categoriza-
tion became less useful. . . . The time was ripe for a new, simplifying categor-
ization. The First World became the North and the Third World became the
South’ (Reuveny and Thompson 2007, 557). But what about the Second
World?
Rather than joining the North or the South, the East has fallen between the
cracks. I use ‘East’ here as a shorthand not so much for a geographical region,
but for an epistemic space – a liminal space in-between North and South.
While I make sense of this East through the experience of the former Second
World, the notion of the East as a global East is not limited to that experience
but may, and indeed should, encompass other liminal societies. The demise
of the Second World’s political project – communism – wiped the East off
the global map, any distinctiveness of more than 70 years of communist rule
erased. The East is too rich to be a proper part of the South, but too poor to
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be a part of the North. It is too powerful to be periphery, but too weak to be
the centre. Power relationships run every which way. The East includes both
colonisers and colonies, aggressors and victims; some countries were both at
the same time (Tlostanova 2008). In other words, the East is slippery, hard to
categorise.
In the global circulation of signs, the East is not nearly as legible as the
Global South, where colonialism has created shared languages, institutions,
knowledge systems and social bonds. Uganda is more easily knowable in the
global centres of media and scholarship than Ukraine, Chile is more familiar
than Czechia and Laos is closer than Latvia. Vargas Llosa, García Márquez
and Coetzee have a ring of instant recognition, whereas Aleksievich, Müller
and Szymborska sound outlandish. All six are recent laureates of the Nobel
Prize in Literature.
The East therefore experiences a dual exclusion. For one thing, it is not
considered part of the Global South. Vijay Prashad’s (2013) The Poorer
Nations, one of the definitive histories of the Global South, wears its geo-
graphical allegiance on the cover sleeve: the map of the Global South
depicted there includes Turkey, Argentina and Chile, but cuts off
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Ukraine, for example – all of them quite a bit
poorer. Comprehensive volumes on the Global South skip the Global East.
An Everyday Geography of the Global South (Rigg 2007) features 90 case
studies in 36 countries, but not one in the Global East. The Handbook on
Cities in the Global South at least acknowledges that ‘much of Eurasia is
ignored’ (Parnell and Oldfield 2014, 3). Institutions of the Global South
(Braveboy-Wagner 2009) limits itself to Asia, Africa and Latin America.
Those silences are all the more worrying since most scholars insist on a
fluid notion of the Global South, without hard boundaries (Dirlik 2007; Roy
and Crane 2015). Still, that notion does not seem fluid enough to include
even parts of the former Second World.
But the East is also separate from the Global North. In writing about the
world’s global cities and centres, the heartlands of democracy and of market
capitalism, the East is a silent bystander. Countries in the East may be on the
way northward, but at the same time seem stuck in eternal transition towards
an elusive modernity. Object of the North American and European mission
civilisatrice, the East is defined through its backwardness, a persistent marker
of Eastern Europe for centuries (Kovačević 2008; Neumann 1999; Todorova
1997; Wolff 1994). It has served as the Other against which Western Europe
has long narrated its own civilisation and progress.
This paper seeks to take one step in the global geopolitics of knowledge
towards putting the East back on the map of knowledge production. It does
so in thinking of it as a Global East – different from, yet connected to, the
rest of the world; equal, not inferior, to the North and South. That is not just
an important epistemic move for people who live in the Global East,
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valorising the distinctiveness and connectedness of their experience, and for
scholars who work on the Global East, who are often at a loss as to how to
position their subject in global scholarship that partitions the world into
North and South.
It is even more a crucial move for theorising. For in an age of theorising
from outside Euro-America (Bhabha 1994; Chakrabarty 2007; Mbembe
2000), good theorising, much less global theorising, cannot happen without
an understanding and a profound appreciation of the diversity and inter-
connectedness of social realities that it purports to refer to. Thinking of a
Global East is perhaps even more important for the Global North and the
Global South, since taking the Global East seriously cannot happen without
unsettling certainties of rich and poor, powerful and powerless, that we have
perhaps grown too comfortable with. Recovering the Global East means
thinking from the interstices of the North and the South – not just for the
East, but also for the North and the South.
This article seeks to create the conditions for thinking of the Global East
through a quadruple move. First, it analyses ‘Eastness’ as a predicament of
being not so much on the margins as in the interstices between North and
South. It therefore underscores Eastness as a liminal condition of in-between-
ness – not-quite North, not-quite-South – rather than as a geographical
location. This in-betweenness is the cause for meeting with ignorance both
in the North and in the South. Second, it demonstrates how the East has
remained unknowable, because it is outside the circuits and conduits of
Western knowledge architecture. Third, it argues for the necessity of a
strategic essentialism of the East that emphasises the unity in difference of
the interstitial position of the East and seeks to recover the East as a political
project. Finally, it shows how the East is and indeed has to be a Global East,
by thinking of it as in the middle of global relations rather than cut off from
them. It thus affirms the openness of the Global East against attempts, from
the inside and outside, to wall it off.
The Predicament of Eastness: Not-quite-North, Not-quite-South
When I teach on the Global East, my students are puzzled as to how I could
possibly be interested in such a dull place. Brazil is sexy, Kenya cool, China
dynamic – the East, however, is boring. I was both relieved and crestfallen to
learn that I am not alone. In a review of the literary peculiarities of the East,
Mikanowski (2017, n.p.) notes: ‘I know a distinguished scholar of the region,
a historian who teaches a regular course on Eastern European history, who
told me that every year he has to answer questions from his students about
whether people actually love and laugh in this “grey place”’. I suppose I
would rather teach on the ‘dark continent’, and at least garner the compas-
sion of do-gooders, than on a ‘grey place’ that evokes no emotion at all – the
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terra incognita of the world, where Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro and
Molvanîa2 blend into an amorphous mass.
The predicament of the East marks a dual exclusion: from the entitled
Global North and from the marginalised Global South. But it is not pure
Otherness. It is rather a semi-alterity (Tlostanova 2017), a demi-orientalism
(Wolff 1994). The East is different but similar, Other but not quite. As much
a ‘grey zone’ of indeterminacy (Knudsen and Frederiksen 2015) as it is a grey
place. The Global North, often in the guise of ‘Europe’, serves as the
teleological horizon against which the East becomes a not-quite-North.
Countries may join the European Union, but the subtle distinctions of
habitus of Eurocrats in the corridors of power in Brussels continue to mark
the difference between the East and the West (Kuus 2014) as does the racism
that Eastern European immigrants experience in Western Europe (Nowicka
2017). People may partake of European consumption, such as in the ubiqui-
tous evroremont (Sgibnev 2015), but never quite become fully European. This
‘Eastness’, as some scholars have called it (Kuus 2007; Zarycki 2014), has
been a marker of the East for decades, if not centuries, notwithstanding EU
accession, decades of economic growth, widespread privatisation and
democratisation.
In this regard, the East shares much with the postcolonial condition of
being in the ‘waiting room of history’ (Chakrabarty 2007, 8), striving for a
modernity in which it may participate, but only at the discretion and grace of
Europe, extending its mission civilisatrice and everything that comes with it
to the ‘Wild East’ (Gille 2016; Horvat and Štiks 2012; Melegh 2006). For if the
East were ever to arrive in Europe, ‘everything is [already] anticipated,
thought out, demonstrated, made the most of’, to quote Fanon’s (2008, 91)
famous phrase.3 What holds the East together is then not so much political
unity, common economic ties or cultural traditions (Hann et al. 2016), no
longer the common experience of socialism (Müller 2019), but rather a
shared feeling of simultaneous difference and resemblance to an amorphous
Europe.
One could also, in a more political economic inclination, read the East
through Immanuel Wallerstein’s (1979) three-tier world-systems theory.4 But
the picture becomes a little more muddled here. While for Wallerstein (1976)
the socialist states belonged to the semi-peripheral countries, this picture has
changed since the socialist implosion. Some Central Asian, South Caucasus
and Southeast European states today plausibly count as peripheral, whereas
most EU countries in Eastern Europe are economically growing more and
more into the core. This, at least, is the observation of several sources that
attempted to apply Wallerstein’s categories today (Babones and Babcicky
2011; Bradshaw 2001; Knox, Agnew and McCarthy 2014, 22). Those states
that remain semi-peripheral, such as Russia or Romania, share the same,
quite heterogeneous category of other semi-peripheral states like Greece,
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Chile, Botswana and Vietnam. A world-systems analysis therefore represents
a splintering picture of the East as partly North, partly South and partly in-
between.
Although the East, as demi-Other of the West, resembles the South’s
postcolonial condition, it is not included in the South’s fight for emancipa-
tion. Just as it is not quite North, it neither is quite South. In the push for de-
colonial knowledge and theorising from the South, the East gets no mention:
it is not that it is lumped in with Latin America, Asia and Africa. No, it
simply is not part of this project. Little does that surprise if we consider a
standard definition of North and South:
The North-South divide is broadly considered a socio-economic and political
divide. Generally, definitions of the Global North include the United States,
Canada, developed parts of Europe, and East Asia. The Global South is made up
of Africa, Latin America, and developing Asia including the Middle East (from
Wikipedia, quoted in Mignolo 2014a, n.p.).
This definition encircles the Global East. So do attempts to theorise from the
South. Raewyn Connell’s (2007) seminal Southern Theory locates the South in
Africa, Latin America, India and Iran (exactly the regions mentioned in the
definition above). Jean and John Comaroff’s (2011) Theory from the South
looks at Africa and Ananya Roy’s (2009) New Geographies of Theory at India.
The absence of the East in the project of the Global South is striking, though
perhaps not surprising. It has, again, to do with its in-between status – in
social, economic and political terms. Comaroff and Comaroff (2011, 46)
puzzle: ‘On which side [of North and South], for example, do the countries
of the former USSR fall?’. As the former Second World, the societies of the
East did not organise at venues such as the Bandung conference for a third way
between capitalism and socialism. When the socialist camp collapsed during
the events from 1989 to 1992, it looked as though, with the transition to
capitalism, the East was going to join the North. Yet, even after more than
25 years of that collapse, that transition remains unfinished, both in terms of
achieving the level of wealth in the North and in terms of building institutions
of market capitalism. The East ended up with a hybrid of socialist legacies,
neoliberal capitalism and informal and patrimonial practices.
Colonialism also marks the East, although in a different way from the
South. Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the South (Dirlik 2007), also in
terms of its importance for theorising, colonialism runs no straightforward
way in the East. Many parts of the East have seen successive waves of
colonisation, by the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and
the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, with rather different systems of
domination. The Western imposition of market reforms in the 1990s
(Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny 1995) has added another relationship of dom-
ination to the pre-existing ones.
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If the colonised is defined in relation to the coloniser (Fanon 1952),
then the East has multiple identities. Some countries were both colonisers
and colonies. Madina Tlostanova (2008, 2011) problematises this inter-
stitial position for the case of Russia, cast into a dual role of both colonial
empire (both during and after the Soviet Union) and subaltern Other (of
Europe) – a subaltern empire, as she calls it. As such, the East sits
uneasily between the mostly postcolonial societies of the South and the
centres of power of the North. That turns the relationship coloniser/
colonised in the East into a multi-layered one, where there is no clear
metropole. If you are Bulgarian, is Istanbul, Moscow, Brussels or New
York your metropole?
Finally, unlike in the South, people have not found in the East a cause for
compassion, global activism or a source of alternatives to neoliberalism,
environmental destruction, power politics and rampant nationalism. The
former heart of Ronald Reagan’s ‘evil empire’, it lacks the moral high ground
of the subaltern and disenfranchised that propels the Global South –
Euromaidan and Rose, Tulip and Orange Revolutions notwithstanding. The
wretched of the Earth, struggling for emancipation and self-determination,
do not seem to reside in the East. Many people in the Global East are white
and both perpetrators and victims of racism but also victims of racism, such
as Polish immigrants in Britain (Nowicka 2017). ‘Russians and Eastern
Europeans have become after 1989 the off-white blacks of the new global
world – looking and behaving too similar to the same, yet remaining
essentially other’ (Tlostanova 2017, 8). Katherine Verdery (2002, 20), in a
powerful turn of phrase, once wrote that it was unclear who would be the
Frantz Fanon of the post-socialist East. A tough question to which I would
reply: There can be no Frantz Fanon of the East. After all, who would s/he
speak to and with what right?
So the East is inferior, but not inferior enough. It is kind of subaltern, but
not really. It is not rich, but neither is it poor. It has some elements of
European modernity, but lacks others: too different to be included in the
North, too European to be included in the South. Most societies of Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union are embroiled in this interstitial relation
of not quite North and not quite South. They may be members of the EU,
even high-income countries, but still do not quite belong to the club. Just
think of Poland. Or conversely, they may be poor and former colonies, such
as Tajikistan or the Russian Caucasus, but are still not counted among the
South. They are, at best, a ‘secondary South’ (Tlostanova 2011). Attempts to
work towards a dialogue between the South of the Global East, such as the
colonies of Soviet Russia, and the Global South are few and far between
(Chari and Verdery 2009; Karkov 2015; Tlostanova 2011, 2015b)
It is that liminality that makes debates on the Global North and Global
South pass by the East: not out of spite, but because the East does not fit the
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frame through which we think the global. So this in-betweenness does not
turn the East into something like Homi Bhabha’s (1994) fertile third space, a
trading zone between cultures and meanings. On the contrary, the East seems
stuck in stasis, whereas the rest of the world has moved on to be enveloped in
a net of global connections and mobilities. Writes Mikanowski:
Many times, I’ve fallen into pockets of Eastern Europe far west of the Oder–Trieste
line. It’s happened to me below highway overpasses, in line at the DMV
[Department of Motor Vehicles in the United States], and in the waiting rooms
of neglected bus stations. I’ve always thought that Proustian moments were a
completely false construct, a literary conceit, but I’ll be damned if I haven’t been
caught by the smell of tired dirt covering a bathroom in the basement of one of
Berkeley’s physics labs and, in an instant, been transported to the stairwell of my
grandmother’s Warsaw apartment building, with its mixture of stale urine and
tired dirt and old mop water, unsweetened by soap (Mikanowski 2017).
Mikanowski here captures Eastness as a feeling of forsakenness and of
disconnection from the world. Highway overpasses, waiting rooms of
neglected bus stations, basements – globality happens elsewhere. Eastness is
an inert condition, as though fallen out of time and space.
This condition of being stuck in time manifests itself in how we refer to
the geographical area of today’s East, always indexing the past – post-
socialist, ex-Soviet, former USSR, old Eastern bloc, former Second World –
as though, after almost 30 years, the communist East had not found its way
into the present yet. Bestsellers such as Aleksievich’s Nobel Prize-winning
Second-Hand Time or Orland Figes’s Just Send Me Word recall the Soviet
experience. The bestselling books about current affairs are about the putative
new cold war. One of the principal academic journals on the East describes
itself as ‘focusing on the history and current political, social and economic
affairs of the countries of the former “communist bloc”’ (Europe-Asia Studies
2018).
Included neither in the North nor in the South, stuck in stasis, the East has
disappeared from ‘the global’ at large. Try to find a significant role of the East
in debates on, say, global urbanism, global business or global mobilities. The
point here is not so much that the East gets little mention, although that is
often true as well. It is more that the East is not thought of as part of global
connections (Rogers 2010). It does not partake of ‘the global’ – of global
flows of images and ideas, people and policies. If the ‘East’ exists, it does not
deserve the modifier ‘global’. One could be forgiven to believe that the iron
curtain had never fallen.
Outside the Western Knowledge Architecture
But the iron curtain is gone. A self-confident re-inscription of the East is
overdue, not least to unsettle the binary of North and South. Claiming a
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voice for the East in academic debates can counter, or at least challenge, the
dominant cultural circuits of knowledge production (Buchowski 2004; Timár
2004)5 and parallel attempts at a self-isolation of the East (Funk 2017). It can
attempt to recast the hemispheric ‘geopolitics of knowledge’ (Mignolo 2002)
increasingly organised into North and South.
Part of the political impetus of recovering the East is to reclaim the great
diversity that so often gets written out and reduced to a caricature of a
monotonous ‘grey place’. A diversity that is not just ethnic (although it is
that as well), but political, cultural and economic – and that belies the
homogenising moniker as ‘former Eastern bloc’, a favourite of news com-
menters still today. From the poster child of European reform policies that is
Estonia via the dictatorship in Belarus to the global ambitions of Kazakhstan.
From the former imperial core that is Russia via conflict-torn Ukraine to the
centrifugal peripheries of Slovenia. That diversity, and its effects on people’s
lives, is perhaps best encapsulated in the joke about the old man who says he
was born in Austria-Hungary, went to school in Czechoslovakia, married in
Hungary, worked most of his life in the Soviet Union, and retired in Ukraine.
‘Travelled a lot, then?’ asks his interviewer. ‘No, I never moved from
Mukachevo.’
The larger point at stake here is that the East does not fit easily into
existing architectures of knowledge in a mostly Anglophone world
(Tlostanova 2015a). English does not travel far as a lingua franca, Western
colonialism has not established shared institutions or family bonds and the
after-effects of the iron curtain, which had complicated the forging of
research collaborations, can still be felt. Émigré intellectuals and scholars
from the Global South – Stuart Hall, Gayatri Spivak, Edward Said, Achille
Mbembe, Aimé Césaire – often ended up in the colonial centres in Britain,
France or the United States, inserting themselves into Anglophone or
Francophone circuits of knowledge production. Yet, if Eastern scholars
went, as they often did, to Moscow, the centre of the Soviet empire, they
spoke to a limited audience and, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, faced
a growing linguistic isolation and declining global reach. For aspiring intel-
lectuals in the East, French and German, not English, the language of market
capitalism, were the foreign languages of choice. That influenced in what
circuits knowledge from the East and about the East could travel. Ironically,
remaining outside British and French colonialism limited the chances of the
East to be heard.
Another dynamic at play in the absence of voices from the East in global
debate is the blow that the collapse of socialism dealt to scholarship in the
East. The impact of that blow is still felt today. Not just did funding vanish
almost overnight, but academics found themselves in a situation where the
idea of what makes a good scholar had changed radically. Many left academia
and their countries in order to survive and those who stayed had to (and
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sometimes still have to) work side jobs to make money, especially in those
disciplines like the humanities and social sciences whose work was thought to
be of little practical value. Academic work offered no future and lacked a
viable income, so few young scholars could enter academia in the 1990s and
2000s to weigh in to debates. Instead, they went to study and work abroad
(Ushkalov and Malakha 2010). Against this background, it is not surprising
‘that the removal of restrictions on publishing, and the social transformations
themselves, in Central and Eastern Europe had not led to an explosion of
new home-grown analyses of communist and postcommunist reality’
(Outhwaite and Ray 2005, 12) How could it? The socialist collapse had all
but wrecked research in the East and the situation has just started to change
in the past few years.
Towards a Strategic Essentialism of the East
Considering these odds, the political project of reclaiming a voice for the East
becomes even more important. In so doing, I think we should keep the term
‘East’, not shying away from confronting its old connotations of backward-
ness and otherness. For terms such as ‘New Europe’ or ‘Central Europe’
(Garton Ash 1999; Kundera 1984), attempting to dissociate from the East
risks reproducing the teleological horizon of Europe and lapsing into euro-
centrism. They merely shift, as scholars have observed, the boundary of the
‘backward East’ further to the East, locating the Other elsewhere (Kuus 2004;
Melegh 2006), rather than breaking with it. It is also important to think of
the East – like the North and the South – not primarily in geographical
terms, but as an ontological and epistemological category, so as not to risk
collapsing it with a delimited world region.
‘The East’ is, of course, a polysemic, malleable term. In its various uses,
it has extended from Eastern Europe and Russia to Japan and China, to
what is sometimes known as the Middle East, including Turkey (Goody
1996; Mahbubani 2008; Mignolo 2014b; Neumann 1999; Said 1978;
Zarakol 2011). That it usually serves as the Other of a thus affirmed
West is one of its persistent features. This paper develops its argument
in thinking from one of those multiple Easts: those societies in the former
Second World that experienced the domino collapse of socialism between
1989 and 1992. But if Eastness is a predicament of semi-alterity, the
notion of the Global East should not remain limited to those societies.
It should, indeed, be relevant for all those that are neither hither nor
thither.
It is its malleability that serves a concept such as the Global East well,
suggesting not clear-cut boundaries and fixed territories but topological links
and blurred zones. The East is always elsewhere: when I ask in France, the
East is in Germany; when I ask in Germany, the East is in East Germany;
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when I ask in East Germany, the East is in Poland; when I ask in Poland, the
East is in Ukraine, . . . a continuous displacement of signifieds attached to the
signifier of the East. ‘The East’ can thus be thought of as a floating signifier, a
signifier without a fixed signified. A signifier that says more about the person
using it than about the object thus denoted. That feature makes it amenable
to serve for the political project of re-inscribing the East. With Laclau (2005,
chap. 5), floating signifiers enable the articulation of political demands, since
they are able to accommodate a diversity of meanings (in Laclau’s parlance,
they link political demands in a chain of equivalence). By virtue of not having
any fixed meaning themselves, they lend themselves to the inscription of
meaning.
It is that quality of malleability, inclusiveness and pointing beyond fixed
territories that is much less present in concepts such as ‘Eurasia’, which has
become popular to denominate large parts of the former Soviet Union
(Russia and Central Asia in particular) (Grant 2012; Hann et al. 2016).
Eurasia is very much a territorial concept and one, at that, with a problematic
meaning tied to the ideology of Eurasianism that has experienced a revival in
Russia for a while now (Suslov and Bassin 2016). Eurasianism has given
nationalist and extremist forces in Russia moral and pseudo-scientific legit-
imation to pursue an ideology of empire. Laruelle (2016, 136) sums up this
problematic aspect: ‘[Eurasia] expresses, conveniently and in a rather intui-
tive way, the historical space of Russia and its “peripheries,” and a certain,
fast-moving geopolitical reality. . . . In countries such as the Baltic states and
Ukraine, being studied academically as part of a Eurasian Department raises
concerns’. Smith and Richardson (2017, 4–5) call Eurasia a ‘myth’: ‘[an]
incoherent mess of spaces. . . . We find a Eurasia of myriad forms . . . defined
by inconsistencies and incoherence’.
If we accept that proposition of polyphony and inconsistency, then we
perhaps best think of the East as a strategic essentialism (Spivak 1988b): a
political practice to mobilise heterogeneous marginalised groups to band
together under a common banner for an emancipatory political project.
Strategic essentialisms put aside differences for a while to articulate political
demands vis-à-vis a hegemonic discourse. Many things can be ‘political’ in
this context: the right of recognition, the production of what counts as valid
knowledge, the freedom from discrimination. Such strategic essentialisms
have been important tactics in feminism (Rose 1993), post-colonialism
(Spivak 1993) and, more recently, in the rally for the Global South
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2011; Parnell and Robinson 2012) to voice
demands.
The case of the Global South, also a strategic essentialism, is particularly
instructive here, as it also revolves around a marginalised but highly hetero-
geneous category and involved reclaiming a paternalistic concept. In fact,
when the term ‘South’ (then still without the ‘global’) emerged in debates in
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the 1970s, it was a poorly disguised replacement for ‘developing countries’
that signalled the paternalistic responsibility of the North to rectify inequal-
ities and ‘save’ the poor South. It was more regressive than the term ‘Third
World’, which had become a political project owned by the South, marked by
the Bandung Conference of 1955 (Dirlik 2007; Prashad 2013).
The recent push to start theorising from the South and dislodge the telos
of modernity (associated with the Global North) has re-inscribed the mean-
ing of the South (Chakrabarty 2007; Comaroff and Comaroff 2011; Robinson
2006): not just can and must the South be a source of theorising in its own
right, but these theoretical insights speak to theorising in the North.6
The argument is perhaps most pronounced in Comaroff and Comaroff
(2011), who see the North, with its perennial crises, instability and insecurity,
austerity and social and ethnic cleavages, as evolving Southward and thus, in
turn, the South as frontrunner of a theorisation of this novel condition. ‘The
so-called “New Normal” of the North is replaying the recent past of the
South’ (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012, 123).7 The North as playing catch-up
with the South: what a refreshing way of turning the world on its head.
Although the Comaroffs’ argument rests mostly on the deleterious global rule
of neoliberalism – a rule that seems increasingly shaky with recent nationalist
tendencies – the thrust of the argument is clear: the South has something to
tell, not just to itself but also to the North.
The South’s push for emancipation may be a model for the East in its
political thrust to decolonise the production of knowledge and put itself back
on the map. This putting back on the map, however, cannot happen without
thinking of the East as part of the global: as a Global East.
A Global East: Following the Bevelled Drinking Glass
Let us try and think of a Global East that is not cut off from the world, frozen
in space and time. Let us think of the Global East through the bevelled
drinking glass (Figure 1), an IKEA staple. The bevelled drinking glass is
ubiquitous around the world. It stands on the tables of presidents and
students. I have it next to me here on my desk. And I bet you have had it
in your mouth, too. There are no official figures, but I reckon, based on my
casual observation of people’s cupboards in different parts of the world, that
total sales have reached several billions. No wonder, at not even 70 cents per
unit, the bevelled drinking glass is priced competitively and survives almost
any attempt, intentional or not, to destroy it. Although most of us think of it
as an IKEA product, the bevelled is a materialisation of the East that has gone
global. IKEA’s design does not conceal its inspiration from a Soviet design
classic, Vera Mukhina’s granyonyi stakan (гранёный стакан), a staple of
Soviet glassware since at least 1943 (Idov 2011, 78).
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One could be tempted to read of the bevelled drinking glass as yet another
story of the ‘banal cosmopolitanism of consumer culture’ (Featherstone 2006,
390) and of global corporations riffing on (or ripping off?) vernacular knowl-
edge. But it is quite a bit more than that. For one thing, the granyonyi stakan
already had its first success story in the East, where, after World War II, five
or six hundred million glasses were produced annually (Idov 2011, 80). So
the glass should rather be read as a global consumer product designed in the
East, copied in the West. This represents a rare reversal of the normal order
of things in a world where design seems to be a prerogative of the creative
centres of the Global North, encapsulated in the ubiquitous ‘designed in
California, assembled in China’ on Apple products.
But the bevelled drinking glass also has a production story to it. Much
of IKEA’s glassware is made in the Global East. Cheap inputs (primarily
energy) and expertise in glass-making mean that there is a competitive
edge. IKEA produced its best-selling glass product, Pokal (see Figure 2), in
Russia for a long time, before switching to Bulgaria, presumably due to the
country’s still low production costs but membership of the EU, which
made export easier.
The story of the bevelled drinking glass is that of an interstitial position of
the Global East as both on the contributing and on the receiving end of
globalisation. ‘Designed in the Global East, made in the Global East’ – this
formula expresses the duality of the Global East in globalisation. But it also
drives home another important point: that the East is entangled in global
relations. It is bound up with the world, not withdrawn. This seems like an
obvious point, but the East, as we have seen, is often conceived of as the very
opposite: as fallen out of space and time.
Figure 1. Can you spot the difference? The Soviet granyonyi stakan (left) and IKEA’s contempor-
ary re-interpretation called Vardagen (right).
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Viewing the Global East as relational implies a topological concept of the
East (Shields 2012; for the East specifically see Rogers 2010; Tuvikene 2016),
where anywhere can become part of the East if it is tied into the right
relations. The material presence of the IKEA glass on my desk right here
ties me to the Global East; so does the edition of Made in Russia lying right
next to it. In other words, the challenge of the Global East is to think in
topological fashion: to think along relations that draw the far away close and
bind together things that are not adjoining (Mol and Law 1994). The Global
East – as relation – can be anywhere. Asking ‘where is the Global East?’ is
therefore the wrong question, because it points us to territories. We would do
better to ask ‘what is the Global East?’, directing us to relations.
So the point of a relational notion of the East is precisely not to limit it to
the territories of the former Second World. When Soviet writer Ilya
Ehrenburg wrote that Berlin was the stepmother of Russian cities, he was
hinting at the trans-local relation of the East. Ehrenburg was one of the
hundreds of thousands Russian émigrés after the October Revolution who
had found an Ersatz home in Berlin and made it, in the words of Karl
Schlögel, a surrogate capital (Ersatzhauptstadt) (Schlögel 2007). But one
does not need to go back one hundred years to Berlin’s Charlottengrad to
find the Global East everywhere: in the Russian-speaking communities in
New York’s Little Odessa (Miyares 1998) and Cyprus’s Limmasol, in
London’s East European communities (Neumann 2015), in Ukraine’s trans-
national evangelicals (Wanner 2007). It is there in Russian interference in
elections in the United States, in ‘mobile mothers’ that shuttle between
Moldova and Istanbul (Keough 2016), in the connections between the oil-
rich regimes in Central Asia and the Persian Gulf (Koch 2016), in the
Republic of Georgia’s global promotion as a poster child for post-Soviet
Figure 2. Made in the Global East: IKEA’s flagship glass Pokal.
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reform (Schueth 2011) – and in the story of consumer products such as the
granyonyi stakan.
In a way, the most interesting part of the East is perhaps not its core, but
its extensions and trading zones. Following these extensions also opens up
new avenues for comparison of countries, phenomena and places that many
would consider too different to be comparable but which, for that very
reason, can produce revealing insights. Comparing the neo-patrimonial gar-
rison states of the United States and Russia, the built modernism of Tashkent
and Brasília and the evangelicals of Ukraine and Nigeria has an important
epistemological function: it establishes the East not as fundamentally differ-
ent and guards against its exoticisation as Other. It decentres the West and
universal knowledge claims emerging from there (Robinson 2016; Sidaway
2013).8
The focus on relations reveals the affinities of the concept of the Global
East to a third wave of area studies, much shaped by processes of globa-
lisation, connection and mobilities, and the engagement with social and
cultural theory (Middell 2013; Mielke and Hornidge 2016; Sidaway et al.
2016). This third wave, self-reflexive as it is, critically assesses previous
assumptions of areas as bounded and the colonial production of knowl-
edge about areas from the centre, seeking to push towards an analysis of
global connections and a decentring of knowledge production. It treads a
precarious path between dismissing localised expertise out of hand alto-
gether in favour of disembedded global studies (Koch 2016, 650) and
reifying regions as self-contained entities (van Schendel 2002). For the
Global East, the important realisation is this: knowledge from places
remains important, without having to be attributed to a particular region
as an epistemological frame. In other words, where something happens
makes a difference, but it does not make all the difference. Places may
create an affordance, a specific possibility for action, that may or may not
be actualised. In Chari’s (2016, 792) phrasing, we need to commit to
‘being-with in a world of simultaneous interconnection and ontological
difference’. This asks us to cultivate the Global East through a global sense
of place: not self-enclosed and defensive but outward looking, without ever
losing whatever constitutes its specificities (Massey 1991).
Conclusion: Theorising with the Global East
In thinking of the world as divided into a Global North and a Global South,
the East has ended up in some sort of netherworld. Its interstitial position –
not quite rich, but neither quite poor; not just colony, but neither just
coloniser – has made it difficult to categorise. Cast as backward and
closed-off, scholarship and public discourse have had a tendency to consider
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the East as somehow separate and distant from the world, not having much
to contribute to it.
This article has made the case for embracing the East as a Global East:
to reclaim a place and a voice for it in the world. This involves thinking of
the East as a strategic essentialism that allows both re-establishing it as a
pertinent preoccupation of scholarship and re-inscribing it with new
meaning. The East as Global East means placing the East right in the
middle of the world. If we see the Global East as bound up with multiple
other places, it becomes harder to leave it at the sidelines of theorising.
Neither North nor South, it helps us avoid hemispheric binaries of rich
and poor, powerful and powerless when thinking of the global. Engaging
in global comparative research guards against isolation of the East by
making its multiple experiences – of empire, globalisation, neoliberal
reform, nationalist populism, political resistance, asymmetric wars –
speak to similar debates elsewhere.
Thinking of a Global East is therefore also a political project. Not only
does it write against the demi-othering of the East in the North and the
silence about the East in the South, thus seeking to make the experiences of
people in the East count and dislodge eurocentrism, but it also affirms the
East as an open place, reaching out rather than withdrawn. As we see a surge
of nationalist populism in the North, South and East that seeks to wall off
countries rather than build bridges, asserting openness becomes an impor-
tant political statement. With the supposed heartlands of liberal democracy
in Britain and the United States in turmoil, this political project may come at
an opportune time, when the differences between North and South, East and
West become increasingly blurred and established hierarchies are called into
question.
While this paper has theorised the Global East from the vantage point of
the former socialist societies of the Second World, the condition of Eastness
– a demi-otherness that hovers between North and South – extends much
beyond. What about South Korea, Turkey or the ominous Middle East?
Thinking with the East means drawing out the silences of the hemispheric
North–South divisions, working not so much from its margins as from its
interstices. The idea is not to resurrect another binary – that of West–East –
but to destabilise the binary geopolitical imagination through the introduc-
tion of a tertium quid.
In embracing the Global East as tertium quid, we would therefore do well
to also embrace its liminal position, its semi-alterity. The traditional response
has been to think of this interstitial position as something to get rid off or
transition from, in the move from periphery to core. But why do we not
think of this liminality as a strength? Why do we not utilise the resources it
offers to address uncertainties, unpredictabilities and improvisational tactics?
Thinking from between North and South would then mean thinking about
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ambiguity and ephemerality – not just for the East, but also for the North
and South.
In this way, embracing its liminality inscribes the Global East not just into
multiple unfurling debates around the geopolitics of knowledge (Mignolo
2002) – a third wave of area studies that interrogates the politics of repre-
sentation and foregrounds transnational links (Sidaway et al. 2016) and
theorising from the South (Connell 2007) – it also invites to tease out what
thinking with the East means for conceptualising the paradoxes and uncer-
tainties that mark globalising societies and that have gained so much traction
in scholarship in the past decades (Bauman 2006; Prigogine 1996; Žižek
2011).
Theorising about the Global East will therefore not be enough. Re-inscrib-
ing the Global East cannot happen without turning the tables on knowledge
production about it. In so doing, we need to turn the East from an object of
area studies into a subject, or indeed a method – a ‘means of transforming
knowledge production’ (Chen 2010, 216). It matters whence this re-inscrip-
tion takes place. The recent upsurge of scholarship from the Global East
leaves little doubt that the time has come to theorise not just about, but with
the Global East.
Notes
1. In accordance with common usage, I write ‘communism’ when referring to the
ideology and ‘socialism’ when referring to the socio-political realities.
2. Molvanîa is a fictional country, portrayed in a parody of a guidebook that plays on
Western stereotypes of the East (Cilauro, Gleisner and Sitch 2004). See also Malcolm
Bradbury’s invention of the fictional East European country Slaka (Bradbury 1986).
3. The French original is much pithier than the translation: ‘tout est prévu, trouvé,
prouvé, exploité’ (Fanon 1952, 97).
4. Wallerstein proposes a three-tier structure of stratification into core, semi-periphery
and periphery, which results from two forms of economic processes: core processes of
high wages, advanced technology and a diversified production mix and peripheral
processes that involve low wages, more rudimentary technology and a simple produc-
tion mix. His intermediate category of the semi-periphery is not just an economic mix
of the two, but, more importantly, has a political function: it provides political stability
by taking the edge off the polarisation between core and periphery. ‘One might make a
good case that the world-economy as an economy would function every bit as well
without a semiperiphery. But it would be far less politically stable’ (Wallerstein 1979,
23). According to Wallerstein (69), the two characteristics of semi-peripheral countries
are protectionist policies (‘home market for home products’) and the politicisation of
economic decisions.
5. The perspective of post-socialism, an attempt to make sense of the East after the
socialist collapse (e.g. Hann 2001), was a product of those circuits, lodged in Anglo-
American scholarship. Scholars in the East have critiqued it for being ‘an orientalising
concept through which western anthropologists constructed postcommunist Europe’
(Červinková 2012, 159).
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6. This is also true for the recent push to theorise from Asia in the ‘Asian century’; see for
example Kuan-Hsing Chen’s (2010) Asia as Method and Kishore Mahbubani’s (2008)
The New Asian Hemisphere.
7. The frequent invocation of the differences between North and South should not elide
that literature has started to look at the relations that cut across North and South and
blur boundaries (e.g. Caison and Vormann 2015; Roy and Crane 2015).
8. Recent literature on the Global North and South has stressed these topological relation-
ships of the North in the South (e.g. gated communities) and the South in the North
(e.g. poverty) (e.g. Miraftab 2009; Roy and Crane 2015).
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